Able Danger (DIA/SOCOM) and the 2006 Inspector General Finding
programIntelligence & Surveillance · Media & Managed Opposition
A congressman said a secret military programme had identified the hijackers a year early. The Pentagon's own investigators looked, and said it hadn't.
Who they are
Able Danger, a military data-mining programme, and the 2006 Inspector General investigation into claims made about it[1].
What they do
The engine holds the allegation and the finding together, because the finding is the part that usually goes missing.
How it works
From 2005, Representative Curt Weldon said Able Danger analysts had identified Mohamed Atta and others before September 2001, and that rules about holding data on US citizens stopped them telling the FBI. Six separate congressional requests - from Weldon, Duncan Hunter, Charles Grassley, McCain and Lieberman, and Hoekstra and Wolf - pushed the Defense Department's Inspector General to investigate.
Why it matters
The investigators answered directly: 'We did not substantiate those allegations. The evidence did not support assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001, terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team members were prohibited from sharing information with law enforcement authorities, or that DoD officials reprised against LTC Shaffer.' The report number usually attached to this - 06-INTEL-10 - is the wrong one. That number belongs to a report about detainee abuse.
The engine's record — word for word
Classified military data-mining effort on transnational terrorist networks, the subject of congressional controversy from 2005 when Representative Curt Weldon asserted its analysts had identified Mohamed Atta and other future hijackers before September 2001, and that data-handling restrictions on 'U.S. persons' blocked transfer to the FBI. THE INVESTIGATION AND ITS FINDING, from the primary document. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Case Number H05L97905217, dated 18 September 2006: "ALLEGED MISCONDUCT BY SENIOR DOD OFFICIALS CONCERNING THE ABLE DANGER PROGRAM AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL ANTHONY A. SHAFFER, U.S. ARMY RESERVE". The transmittal memorandum, signed by Acting Inspector General Thomas F. Gimble, verbatim: "The investigation addressed nine specific allegations raised in the media and by various Members of Congress. We did not substantiate those allegations. The evidence did not support assertions that Able Danger identified the September 11, 2001, terrorists nearly a year before the attack, that Able Danger team members were prohibited from sharing information with law enforcement authorities, or that DoD officials reprised against LTC Shaffer for his disclosures regarding Able Danger." The investigation was framed by requests from Rep. Weldon (7 and 18 Oct 2005), House Armed Services Chairman Duncan Hunter (20 Oct 2005), Sen. Charles Grassley (21 Oct 2005), Sens. McCain and Lieberman (20 Dec 2005) and Reps. Hoekstra and Wolf (8 Feb 2006), and its contents page shows it asked the questions directly: "Did the Able Danger team identify Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 terrorists before September 11, 2001?" and "Did DoD officials improperly direct the destruction of Able Danger mission related data?" CITATION CORRECTED: this is not report 06-INTEL-10. That number belongs to "Review of DoD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse", 25 August 2006 — a 133-page document with zero occurrences of 'Able Danger', 'Shaffer' or 'Weldon' and 395 of 'detainee' — confirmed on four independent hosts. The Able Danger document carries a case number, not an INTEL report number.
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